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R. A. Goodrich
The first part of this paper will examine the intricate connections
between intention and representation by way of John Searle's recent
and provocative analysis of intentionality. In his earlier work on
'speech acts'. it may be recalled, to operate a language meaningfully,
and thus realise our intentions, is to perform one of five basic kinds
of acts according to particular rules and conventions. So, for
example, those acts committing speakers to the truth of propositions
expressed, such as characterisations, descriptions. explanations, and
so forth, are classified as 'assertivc'. Searle suggests that authors of
fictional works intentionally pretend (in a non-deceptive sense) to
'perform such acts against a background of specific conventions'. 1
Something like this conception of speech acts was first publicised
during the seventies in literary critical circles by Ohmann. Pratt and
Fish. 2 The second part of this paper begins to re-assess thc
connection bctween intention and representation within the Iiterary-
based arts, largely by drawing upon the contrasting suggestions of the
latcr Wittgenstein and his followers. Ironically perhaps, token
referenccs to the role intention plays in artistic representation, whilst
common enough, belie their often elusive and problematical
relationship. Nowhere are the sheer complexities of the relationship
more pointedly eXlx)sed than in Searle.
Intentionality, in short, is the property of mental states or events,
such as intention, hope, fear, desire, and bclief, by which they are
directed at states of affairs or are 'of' or 'about' objects, irrespective
See J. R. Searlc. Intentionality. Camt>ridgc. t91B. p. 166. for a t>ricf summary
of thc fivc purportcdly t>asi<.: categorics of spccch acts-asscrtivcs. dircctivcs.
commissivcs. cxprcssivcs. and dcdarations---dctailed in Scarlc's 'A taxonomy of
illocutionary acts' (1975) in bpression and Meaning. Camt>ridgc. 1979. csp.
pp.12-20 (Scarlc's collcction also contains his application of speech acts to
fictional works. namcly. "Inc logical status of fictional discoursc' (1975). csp.
pp.61-70).
2 Scc R. M. Ohmann. 'Specch Acts and thc Dcfinition of Litcraturc.· Philosophy
and Rhl'toric. 4: 1 (Wintcr 1(71): 1-19; M. I.. Pralt. Toward a Speech Act
Theory of l.iterary Discourse. D1oomington. 1977, and S. E. rish. 'How to Do
Things with Austin and Searlc' (1977) in Is There a Text in This Class?
Camhridgc. 19HO. pro 197245.
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of whether these states of affairs or objects exist or not. How any
intentional state is realised-whether pictorially, linguistically, or
behaviourally-is considered 'irrelevant to its logical properties'.3 A
speechless infant may want succour just as an adult may grieve in
silence. In other words, intentionality in any of its forms-intention
being but one amongst many-is not, according to Searle, 'essentially
and necessarily linguistic'; indeed, their 'logical dependence is
precisely the reverse' in that 'language, supposedly, is logically
dependent upon intentionality'.4 Moreover, contends Searle, every
intentional state 'is intrinsically a representation' which is not
dependent upon 'our use of it as a representation in the manner of
speech or pictures'.5 Furthermore, intentional states do not operate in
isolation, but as part of a network or cluster of heliefs, desires,
intentions, and the like. Such a network, in turn, both presupposes
and is permeated by a background of 'nonrepresentational mental
capacities.'6 That is to say, the multifarious forms of intentionality
presuppose a fundamental set of 'non-representational' ahilities and
skills of mind. In effect, Searle regards such a background as
translatable into basic kinds of 'procedural' knowledge, namely, our
'knowing how to do things' and, more debatably, 'knowing how
things are or work'.7
What in all this does Searle mean hy 'representation'? Re-tracing
his thesis in more detail, we find the term first characterising the
relationship hetween an intentional state and the ohject or state of
affairs at which it is directed. Searle asserts that intentional states
invariably represent states of affairs and objects 'in the same sense of
"represent" that speech acts represent ohjects and states of affairs'.8
3 Searle, Intentionality, p. 15.
4 Searle, Intentionality, p.5. from Searle's point of view, intentionality is only
said to be pedagogically explicable in terms of language. The question of what,
if any. conceptual priority there might be has been succinctly surveyed by, e.g.,
D. M. Rosenthal. 'Intentionality' (1986) in RerepresentQtions. ed. Stuart
Silvers, Dordrecht. 1989, pp.311-39.
5 Searle. Intentionality, p.22.
6 Searle, Intentionality, p.20.
7 Searle, Intentionality, pp. 20,143. Not all of us would unquestioningly accept
that 'know-how about the way things are' or 'know how things are' is
invariably classifiable as procedural knowledge (or 'knowing how to do
something'), and not as propositional knowledge (that is, 'knowing that
something is the case'); initially contrasted by Gilbert Ryle. The Concept of
Mind, London, 1949, pp.27-32,40-45,59-60,133-35.
R Searle, Intentionality, pp.4, II.
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parallels between intentionality and speech acts are borne out in a
least four ways which we shal1 illustrate with the libretto by Arrigo
Boito of Guiseppe Verdi's four-act opera Orello (1886).
Just as the Venetians and Cypriots in Act One initial1y predict that
the storm will overwhelm the returning fleet, so, too, can they fear
that the storm will overwhelm the fleet. In the first case-an
illocutionary or complete speech act-we are able to distinguish
between the propositional content, 'that the storm will overwhelm
the fleet', and the assertive illocutionary force with which the
propositional content is presented, namely, 'the Venetians and
Cypriots predict'. Similarly, in the other case of fear-an intentional
state-we can discriminate between the intentional content, 'that the
storm will overwhelm the fleet', and the psychological manner or
mode in which the Venetians and Cypriots have that intentional
content. Next, members of, say, the assertive class of speech acts-
predictions being one of them-in some way match or fail to match
the world and to that extent can be said to have a 'word-to-world'
direction of fit. Similarly, intentional states-such as fear in our
example----can he realised truly or falsely and can thus be described as
having a 'mind-to world' direction of fit. Thirdly, in the performance
of assertive illocutionary acts possessing a propositional content,
Searle believes we simultaneously and necessarily express a
corresponding intentional state with that proportional content. Hence,
if the Cypriots and Venetians make a prediction that the storm will
overwhelm the fleet, then they invariably express at the same time the
belief that the storm will do so. A shift in the illocutionary class from
the assertive to, say, the commissive makes no difference. So, if the
Cypriots had volunteered to save the fleet, then they would have
expressed the intention to save the fleet. Finally, where speech acts
and intentional states have a direction of fit, the notion of having
conditions of satisfaction or fult1lment cqual1y applies to that speech
act and its correspondingly expressed psychological state. Therefore
volunteering to save the fleet will hold if and only if the expressed
intention is enacted, just as predicting the resulting storm will be true
or false if and only if the expressed helief proves true or false.
However, beneath the four paral1els depicted, Searle admits that
the notion of 'representation is 'conveniently vague'.9 Rather than
9 Searle. Intentionality. p. t 1. In the first of a series of papers largely incorporated
within his 1983 book. Searle. 'Intentionality and the Use uf Language' in
Meaning and Use, ed. Avishai Margalit, Dordrecht. 1979, overtly concedes that
the concept of representation remains 'an unanalysed notion' (p. 195).
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leaving his readers with too clastic a conception, Searle stipulates that
representation is 'entirely exhausted by the analogy with speech
acts'. to So, being a representation is tantamount to having a
propositional content and a psychological mode; the content
determining the set of conditions of fulfilment or satisfaction under
certain aspects and the mode determining the direction of fit of the
content. In other words, representation is defined here in terms of its
content and its mode. not in terms of its formal structure.
Consequently. Searle's account ofrepresentation. by being referrablc
to and centred upon the intentionality of mental states, fundamentally
describes the content involved rather than its object. Furthermore. this
conception of representation. made internal to or inherent in mental
states. impels Searle to characterise it from the subject's point of
view. not from a third-person perspective.
Nowhere is Searle's 'internalising' tendency more noticeable than
in cases such as intentions to act because they suggest to us that there
is. prima facie. a causal connection between mental states and the
'external world'. Consider the test-case of Orello. Arrigo Boito
intended to draft the second-act soliloquy. 'Credo in un Dio crudel
... ' If he did so with the further intention or purpose of representing
Jago's malevolence or whatever, then this would prove irrelevant to
Searle. whose concerns are with the immediacy of 'intention in
action'.11 Now. in successful instances of intentions to perform an
act, Searle argues that the intentional content not only represents the
action to be performed but also represents it as the one to be brought
to pass by that very intention such that 'the relationship of causation is
part of the COf/relll. not the object. of these experiences'. 12 Indeed,
Searle's avowal that 'I can only intend what my intention can cause'
seems suggestive of a confusion between. on the one hand. an (inner)
experience felt to be caused and. on the other hand. the object of that
experience which happens to constitute 'the [external] source of
causation' .13
Hence Searle regards causality internally represented to he a self-
referential part of the intentional content without quite specifying what
in the content does the referring. He leaves. as noted above. further
10 Searle.lnlemionalily. p. 12.
11 Searle. Imemionality. pp. 105-06
12 Searle. InlenlioTlality. p. 124
13 Searle. Inlemionalily. p. 105; the confusion was initially identified by J II
Mohanly. 'Intentionality. Causality aud Ilulism'. SYTllhl'JI'. 61: I (Octuber
t984) p.21.
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purpose or causality per se to the side since that would involve an
'external' analysis of the actual object of any intention to act. Yet
what makes Boito's intentional drafting occur can scarcely be
illuminated by Searle's admission that his 'pattern of explanation'
involves a 'circle of intentionality' .14 If the drafting of the soliloquy is
intentional. then, by definition, there is an intention to act, but this
cannot of itself cause the intentional drafting of the soliloquy. To
repeat, what is required for an intentional content is not one and the
same thing as what is required for the intention to put into effect.
Alternatively expressed. to adopt Searle's stance is to threaten the
usual distinction we make between the possession and the
performance of an intention.
Misgivings about Searle's handling of representation
extend even further. Hrst of all, Searle's conceplual coupling of
representation and intention within a wholly internalised perspective
runs counter to the more widely accepted approach associated with
Wittgenstein. The latter's influential arguments, in a reaction against
the use of introspection as the appropriate method for investigating
the nature of mind, lead him to the opposing position where any
presumed 'inner process' stands in need of outward criteria:
An intention is embedded in il~ situations, in human customs and
institutions. If the technique of the game of chess did not exist, I
wuld not intend to playa game of chess. In so far as I do intend the
construction of a sentence in advance, that is made possible by the
fact that I can speak the language in question.l~
Introspection. at best. only provides us with a psychological
account of what is or was true 'for us at the time of introspecting'. 16
It cannot give us a definition of what is necessary for analysing a
psychological concept or state. If we know in advance of
introspecting what defines that concept or state. then appealing to
introspection is quite superfluous. And if, by contrast, we lack such
knowledge. introspection alone cannot guarantee that what we happen
to undergo applies to anyone else or even to ourselves at any other
14 Searle, 'Intentionality and the Use of Language'. p. 196.
15 L. J. J. Willgenstein. Philosophical fnvesligations (1949), cds G. E. M.
Anscombe and Rush Rhees. tr G. E. M. Answmbe, 3rd ed, Oxford. 1967,
part I. SCI:. 580 and 337, pp. 153, 108. For a recent review of his handling of
intention and cognate concepts, sec M. J. Budd, Wittgenstein's Philosophy of
PsycholoMY. London, 1989, esp. pp. 21-45,125-45.
16 See Ryle, pp. t63-67; P. 1'. Gcach, MenIal AC1S, London. 1957. pp.21-22,
23-24,107-11; and Budd, pp.7-1O.
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time. That we were introspectively aware of a particularly threatening
image of Jago when planning to see Orella last week cannot even
begin to define the concept of forming an intention. To believe that the
approaches of Wingenstein and Searle may nonetheless be reconciled
by Searle's appeal to background. to 'a set of nonrepresentational
mental capacities that enable all representing to take place', 17 is
basically illusory. Wittgenstein's behavioural or externalising
perspectives might at first glance seem akin to Searle's conception of
nonrepresentational background until one recalls that background is
finnly tied to one's internal or mental repertoire of skills.
In the second place, the analogy by which representation is
defined begins to dissolve once the difference between intentional
states and speech acts is highlighted. In itself, a squeal or a scratch or
a stretch means nothing. The media of speech acts-be they oral,
graphic, or gestural-must be understood by listeners or readers and
intended by speakers or writers in particular ways-through a body
of rules and conventions-before they can even be counted 'as
realisations of speech acts' .18 By contrast, intentional states do not
require an additional level of intentionality, that is, one of
understanding and intending, for their realisation. Searle appears
confident that 'forms of realisation' are irrelevant to the 'logical
properties' 'of intentional states';19 a confidence not entirely justified
as we shall shortly see.
Thirdly, consider the reversal of our previous example, namely,
Boito failed in an attempt to draft the second-act soliloquy, 'Credo in
un Dio crudel ... ' (in, say, his first effort to complete the libretto of
Orella). In so far as Boito is capable of having intentions. would he
also not be capable of recognising or being aware of the failure or the
fulfilment of his intentions? Would this not, in turn, arise from
Searle's very contention that an intentional state contains a
representation of the conditions of its fulfilment or satisfaction? If so,
then having recognition or awareness would itself have a particular set
17 Searle, Intentionality, p. 143. Contrast Willgenstein. Philosophical Inve.l1iga-
tions here on knowing how to 'obey a rule, to make a report. to give an order,
to playa game of chess' all of which 'are cllSloms (uses, institutions), since it
is 'not possible that there should have been only one occasion' when such
procedures were carried out (part I. sec. 199, p. 81).
18 Also noted by C. D. Martin and Karl Pfeifer, 'Intentionality and the Non-
Psychological', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. vol. 46. no. 4
(June 1986), p.543.
19 Searle, Intentionality. p. 15.
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of conditions of fulfilment or satisfaction, and, by implication, a
representation of that set of conditions. ConsequentIy, it appears that
having recognition or awareness-itself an intentional state capable of
operating at a second-order level----eonjures circumstances of having
representations of representations. Should Boito have acknowledged
at some stage that he was aware of or had recognised his awareness
of having failed, then we now seem to encounter representations of
representations of representations.
In the face of such an objection, Searle declares that it neither
leads to an infinite regression nor does it imply the addition of
intentional states; indeed, he insists, albeit inconsistently, upon the
view that 'the consciousness of the conditions of satisfaction ... is
internal to the states in question'. 20 Perhaps Searle is trading upon
different senses of awareness: an 'internal' one of intentional states
and beliefs as against an 'external' one of 'states of affairs and events.
When claiming, for example, 'Verdi was aware of x' where x is
equivalent to 'Verdi was anxious about the initial reception of Otelto',
then our statement of awareness here is reducible to x. However, if
x only stands for 'the initial reception of Otello, then the statement
'Verdi was aware of x' neither entails nor is entailed by x. In other
words, the charge of regression at least in the case of 'internal'
awareness seems to have dissipated.
Searle's 'internal' thesis nevertheless continues to face other
kinds of doubt. For example, can intentionality in the form of
recognition or awareness define intentionality (which, as summarised
earlier, was first defined in terms of speech acts) and define it without
circularity? Furthermore, can awareness or recognition be ascribed,
not only to mental states. but equally to mechanical and physical
objects such as thermostats and plants which 'are capable of
responding to the presence of heat and of light respectively?' 21 But a
purely physical or mechanical response to an occurrence is rightly
regarded as neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of being
aware or having recognition. The mental state of awareness or
recognition is distinguished from mere response by the possession of
beliefs. In other words, Searle's previously noted attempt to define
intentionality irrespective of its fomls of realisation does not preclude
~ Searlc, Intentionality, p. 22; thc dcclaration appearing in Searlc. 'Intentionality
and thc Usc of Languagc', p. 197. n. 7.
21 As argucd by Martin and Pfcifcr, p.544. Searlc's rcsponsc, in 'Intentionality and
Its Place in Nature', Synthese, 61: I (Octohcr 19H4), is to construe these cases
as 'a mctaphorical ascription' sincc such ohjcct'i lack 'any perception' (pA).
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physical dis(X>sitions to respond. To do that. his account requires
something over and above mere response; it now requires an
independent analysis of the concept of belief.
All in all, Searle has not succeeded in displacing the issue
of 'externality' (for want of a better word) associated with
representation, Even his claim to have avoided traditional ontological
puzzles about intentional entitles-namely. that we are dealing with
relationships. not with the objects (or terms) of relationships-is
eroded when taking the case of Boito's unfulfilled or unsatisfied
intentional states into account. Such states cannot be about nothing
since that would not allow Searle himself from the very beginning to
discriminate between conscious states, such as '[u]ndirected anxiety',
'depression, and elation', and intentional ones which 'must always be
about something',22 In an implicit reversal of his initial stand, Searle
is driven to concede that' Any representation is internally related to its
object in the sense that it could not be that representation if it did not
have that object'.23
If, by applying or adapting Searle, we now committed ourselves
to the internalising of artistic representation when yoked to
intentionality. more questions appear to be raised than resolved.
How, for instance, could we perceive correctly if correctness itself is
informed by the author's intentions or how we understand the thought
conveyed by a work if that thought underlies the author's
intentions?24 The difficulties issue from three principal sources: from
generally misconstruing intentions by solely aligning them with
certain mental or interior processes; from more specifically confusing
the concepts of intention and motive; and, rather ironically, from
ignoring the intentionality of 'seeing as' or aspect perception by
which artistic representation may in part be analysed.
The first source of difficulty manifests itself when investigations
into an author's intentions become embroiled with his supposed
inner feelings, moods, or states of consciousness. Thereafter, the
connection hetween intention and representation can hecome highly
22 Searle, Intentionality. pp. 2. t.
23 Searle. 'Intentionality and the Use of Language'. p. t84.
24 See R. A Wollheim. 'Seeing-as. seeing-in. and pictorial representation'. in An
and Its Objects. 2nd edn. Cambridge. 1980. p. 205 and R V Scruton.
'Representation in Music' (1976) in The Aesthetic Understanding. London.
1983. pp. 62-65 respecti vely regarding these questions.
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problematical. Reports by the author (or any confidante) to the effect
'I had the intention of ... " 'I was going to ... " 'I was on the point
of ... '. or the like 'do not express the memory of an experience',25
An intention, a<; Wittgenstein argues. is neither an emotion, a mood.
nor yet a sensation or image. It is not a state of consciousness. It does
not have genuine duration.26 Consequently. no further interrogation
by us of the mood or the feeling of the author at or before the period
of composing will ensure that his intentions so-called are eventually
and accurately recoverable; a presumption Searle, by contrast. does
not share when analysing the hearer's understanding of
communicative acts. 27 Any correlation between intentions depicted
here and the results of composing seems to be virtually fortuitous.
Consider the amazement expressed at revelations of the discrepancy
between the actual moods or feelings of an author and those portrayed
in his work contemporaneous with these moods or feelings. An acute
example of the discrepancy is captured by Verdi's completion of the
comic opera, Un Giomo di Regno (1840), immediately after his
daughter, son, and wife died in rapid succession. The distortion
im(X)sed by this introspective conception of intention and its workings
is a frequently recognised one at least in principle: 28 if intentions
prove irrelevant to an author's activities when composing. then they
will also be irrelevant to how we, the audience, perceive his
composition when finished.
Now if the foregoing observation appears to return us to the
familiar sounds of the 'intentional fallacy' voiced by Wimsatt and
Beardsley almost half a century ago,29 a small note of caution should
be struck. It will readily be recalled that both men argued as lollows.
Since what matters in our understanding of a work is the work itself
and not the extraneous circumstances surrounding its making, then
any search for the artist's prior intention is neither a genuine nor a
pertinent act of understanding that work. However, amongst the
25 To quote L. J. J. Wittgenstein, Zelll'! (1948). eds G. E. M. Anscombe and
C;. II. von Wright. tr. G. E. M Anscomhe, Oxford. 1967, sec.44. p.IO.
26 Willgenstein. 7.rllel. sec.4S. p. 10.
T! See J. R. Searle, Speech Arts. Cambridge, 1969, pp48-S0.
2R See. e.g., R. A Wollheim. 'Art and Its Objects' (1968) in Art and Its Objects.
2nd edn. Cambridge. 1980. sec 13, p. 19.
:9 W. K. Wimsatt and M. C. Beardsley, 'The Intentional Fallacy' (1946) in W.
K. Wimsatt, The Vcr/wi leon, London, 1970, pp.3-18; an accusation still
maintained in Beardsley's later re-examination of the fallacy. 'Intention
and Interpretation' in The Aesthetic Point of View. eds M. J Wreen and
D. M. Callen, Ithaca. 19112, esp pp.193-203.
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difficulties facing this fallacy is the problem of separating an intention
from its means of expression. If, following Wimsatt and ileardsley. it
were only relevant to consider what an artist intends in exclusive
terms of what his or her artefact makes publicly manifest, 'then is it
not also relevant to ask. 'Manifest to whom?,30 Any reply must
sooner or later centre upon the issue of someone who is not just
familiar with the particular work or works of art by that artist. but also
someone who. in formulating what artistic intentions are relevant. is
wittingly or unwittingly promoting a particular conception of the arts.
A second source of confusion stems from the overlapping of
intention and motive. Witness the subtle shift between. say. 'iloito
first scripted Otella to explore the machinations of evil and to further
his personal ambitions' and 'iloito first scripted Otella out of a desire
to explore the machinations of evil and to further his personal
ambitions'. Yet conceptual distinctions do exist)1 For example,
whereas motives have been classified as referring to some reason for
action before or accompanying that action, intentions are classifiable
by reference to aims or choices pertaining to a future state of affairs.
Further, we can act from motives without possessing any concept of
the motives involved. thus resulting in the notion of unknown or
unconscious motives. ily contrast, we cannot act for a purpose
without a conception of the purpose involved. To confuse intention
and motivation here licenses popular pursuits of such questions as
what inspired Verdi to score Otella after so many years of operative
inactivity. In addition, whilst we can have motives for an intention,
we cannot have intentions for a motive because having a particular
motive, unlike intending to do something, is not a fully voluntary
matter. In any case, no amount of information about intentions as
such is sufficient to ascribe what motives were involved. Finally,
expressions of intention do not logically function in the manner of
statements of motivation. A statement of motives. to be regarded as
truthful. must both be meant and believed by the speaker as well as
judged according to the facts in question. However. an expression of
intention operates differently:
'Ibe expression of an intention in the fonn of a statement about the
future is condemned as a lie not on the grounds merely that it is not
30 Wollheim.·Art and Its Objccts'. scc. 33, p.72.
31 Sec e.g., A. J. P. Kenny. Action. Rmotion and Will, London, 1963. pp. 84-98.
216-21; G. E. M. Anscombe, Intention, 2nd edn, OXford, 1963. esp. Sec. 12-
16, pp. 18-25; and H P Grice. 'Intention and Uncertainty', Proceedings of tire
British Academy, 57 (23 June 1971), pp.263-79.
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fulfilled ... nor ... because the utterer does not expect it to be
fulfilled; but 'only on the grounds that the expression of the
intention is not meanr.32 .
Having disentangled intentions from motives. we now need to re-
align intention and representation in order to avoid the third source of
difficulty. At least two steps are needed to re-connect the concepts of
intention and representation: one penaining to the anefact; the other to
its audience. Let us begin with the well-known anecdote of how
Verdi. in August 1880. proposed to end Act 1llree of Otello with a
Turkish assault off stage and Desdemona left alone to pray for
Otello's victory,33 For once. Boito refused to comply on the grounds
that it would. amongst other things. dissipate the claustrophobic
tension so far accumulated for the last act. In these circumstances,
Verdi's proposal may have provided a conclusion for Act 1llree, but
failed to work. That is to say, in Wittgenstein's words,
it does not fulfil its purpose. What is it for it to have this purpose?
It might also be said: 'It was the intention that this should work as
a [finale],. Whose intention? Here intention as a state of mind
entirely disappears from view.
Might it not even be imagined that several people had carried out an
intention without anyone of them having it?34
In this way, we might continue, a collaborative work of theatre as
much as a corporate body of managers may have an intention that no
one individual has. Indeed, it might be added, can an anefacl. even of
the non-collaborative variety, be analogously classified as intentional
in that it is 'of or 'about' something? To remove intentionality from
an artefact is to invite immediate repercussions, especially upon the
comprehension of its audience. To cite Wingenstein again:
when we intend. we are surrounded by our intention's pictures. and
we are inside them. But when we step outside intention. they are
mere patches on a canvas. without life and of no interest to us.
When we intend. we exist in the space of intention. among the
pictures ...of intention. as well as with real things.3 5
Even if we accepted without dissension the intentionality of anefacts
(as somewhat picturesquely sketched above), it still leaves us the
final task of explicitly pinpointing the link between intention and
32 Kenny,p.219.
33 See Julian Budden. The Operas of Verdi. London. 1981, vol.3. pp. 306-309 for
details and letters regarding the proposed rance/taW finale.
34 Wittgenstein, Zeltel. sec.48. p. 10.
35 Wittgenstein. 7Rttel. sec. 233. p.42.
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representation where representation, we would argue, is at least in
part analysable in terms of aspect perception or 'seeing something
as something else'. Granted it seems impossible, as Wollheim
contends,36 to conceive of any author or composer forming an
intention to represent something unless he could also anticipate how
his artefact (or the part said to do the representing) would appear.
Perhaps we could counter this claim with admittedly controversial
cases of children's scribbled 'representations')7 But be that as it
may, I would rather maintain that the link b~tween intention and
representation centres upon aspects being intentional objects)8
However, Wittgenstein warns us against blindly assimilating what it
is to perceive an object with what it is to perceive an aspect: 'an aspect
is not the property of the object, but an internal relation between it and
other objects' or an 'echo of a thought in sight')9 In other words, the
seeing or perceiving of aspects lies at the intersection of the sensory
and the intellectual, the experiential and the interpretive; thereby
highlighting its irreducibility 'either to a purely sensory or to a purely
intellectual paradigm'.40
Let us finally elaborate a little upon the intentional status of
aspects by taking a brief look at Wollheim's opposing, but dubious,
'aspect perception' thesis that representation is not a 'seeing as', but a
'seeing in', a 'seeing something else in something'. Here, the
temptation arises to ask whether or not the description under which an
aspect falls is in some sense 'in' the artefact without being identical
36 Wollheim.' Art and Its ObjecL~·. sec.13, p.20.
37 Cr.. e.g .• the 'faces' in Howard Gardner. Artful Scribbles. I.ondon. 1980.
fig. 45-48. p.36 or the discussion in L. S. Vygotsky. 'lbe Prehistory of
Wrillen Language' (1935) in Mind in Society, eds Michael Cole et a/..
Cambridge, 1978. pp. 112-14. The controversy in this area centres upon the
issue of whether or not infanL~ are capable of intentions. beliefs. and language.
as pointedly raised throughout D. W. Hamlyn. Experience and the Growth of
Understanding. London. 1978. More pertinently. of course. in asking what
counts as a representation here. Wollheim amongst others would concede that
intention is necessary. but not sufficient. for representation.
38 Sec R. V. Scruton. Art and Imagination. rev. edn, London. 1982. p. 108 who.
following Willgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. classifies 'seeing as'
partly in terms of 'unasserted' thoughtlly virtue of its intentionality. inunediacy
of knowledge. verbalisallie attributions. and subjection to the will; four features
also surveyed by Budd, pp.77-99.
'!J) Willgenstein. Philosophical Investigations. part 2. sec. II. p.212 ('internal'
being understood here a~ 'conceptual' and 'other objects' as 'intentional objects'.
eg .• thoughts and images).
40 Budd. p.99.
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with that artefact or any part of it. In other words, Wollheim's thesis
leads us towards the suggestion that perhaps the aspect itself
somehow conveys or transmits properties. But, as Scruton has
pointedly raised in another context,4 t how do we identify that to
which the putative properties of aspects are attributed? Even on
Wollhcim's own reckoning. 42 the identifying criteria are impossible
to specify. Does this state of affairs therefore return aspect perception
(or 'seeing as') to description or classification in terms, no longer of
properties and objects. but solely of experiences and interpretations?
It does, but surely an affirmative answer from Wollheim must be
qualified. Take. for example, the way in which his hypothesis that we
perceive aspects 'in' artefacts ultimately reveals its derivative nature
(even when limiting ourselves to instances of visual representation).
At the end of Act Three of Olello. we see Jago standing over Ire
prostrate Otello as, say, malignantly triumphant whereas Wollheim
would contend that instead we see malignant triumph in Jago's
stance. What exactly is this stance but a piece of stage business or
choreography by the singer enacting the role of Jago? In that case.
Wollheim's claim that we see the aspect of malignant triumph in
Jago's stance presupposes that we have already understood or
interpreted the sequence of stage business as malignant triumph.
Expressed differently, malignant triumph is not seen in a stance. a
gesture. or a leer until it is already seen as a piece of (musical) theatre,
otherwise we would come far too close to ignoring the fundamental
distinction between the medium of representation and the object
represented.
In sum, the first part of this paper has found Searle's radically
'internalised' approach to intention and definition of representation
rather wanting, if not incomplete. in many crucial details. Neither his
complex stipulations nor his underlying circularity gives us adequate
grounds for dismissing an 'external' account of the two concepts
under examination and their connections. The second part has
attempted to unravel some key areas of confusion afnicting both
concepts. Here. an 'external' perspective. overtly based upon
Wingenstein's later investigations, has enabled us not only to separate
41 Scruton. Art and Imagination. pp.53-54.
42 Sec, c.g., R. A. Wollheim. 'Imagination and Pictorial Understanding', The
Aristotelian Society, suppL voL 60 (1986): p.47 and Painting as an Arl,
Princeton, 1987. pp.46-47.
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intention from introspective processes in general and from motivation
in particular, but also to re-connect aspect perception (or 'seeing as')
with intention when considering representation in the literary-based
arts' .43
43 Discussions in October 1990 with Keith f'leming. John Ozolins. Margo
Schemer and especially Dill Smith of the University of Melbourne helped to
shape this paper.
R. A. Goodrich. M.Ed. is a lecturer in the Department of Language and Literature.
Deakin University. Victoria. 'Ibis paper was read at the June 1992 colloquium of
the Society.
5t Peter's, Rome
Lord. how they flock together,
The poor. the halt, and the lame-
Always. we say unkindly. with us.
Persistently they circle; they pick their way
Around incurious crowds.
I.acklustr'C eyes ca<;t down
On the sensihle shoes of tourists.
On the lTacks between cobblestones.
The sightseers enter the sanctuary
Through portals discoloured a<; old saints' bones.
These others. drab as dust,
Resigned to hope without faith.
Gather at the bottom of the steps.
They fluster when approached.
Pax vobiscum. They know what that stands for.
What kind of handout;
They've heard it all before.
Bohhing and hobbling on shocking pink-grey stumps,
The pigeons throng the piazza.
Missing their lime-burned feet.
Adrian Mitchell
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